“Light must prevail” - this is the life-affirming slogan chosen for this year’s Ukrainian Energy Security Dialogue (UESD) forum, organized by DiXi Group in extremely difficult conditions in the third year of a full-scale war. The event reported that during the massive attacks on the Ukrainian energy system, the aggressor has already launched over 1,600 missiles of various types and about 700 strike drones. More than half of the generating capacity has been lost. But despite the daily threats, the Ukrainian energy system continues to operate and meet the needs of consumers.

But due to the continuation of hostilities, Ukrainian energy and gas companies continue to face considerable risks. In particular, participants in the UESD discussions focused on the intensification of attacks on energy infrastructure and industrial facilities that provide fossil fuel extraction, mentioned cyber threats and information terror, equipment shortages, slowing down investments in the development of local and green generation, and the suspension of Russian gas transit through the Ukrainian gas transportation system (GTS).

Ukrainian Energy listened to the speeches of the UESD participants and compiled a list of key challenges this winter, based on their reports.

Challenge 1: Attacks on energy infrastructure

The Ministry of Energy considers constant attacks on networks and transformers to be the “biggest challenge.” As Deputy Minister Roman Andarak said, the energy system is a “targeted target for aggression” and is experiencing “an impressive scale of destruction.”

Hostile attacks on substations, which play a major role in transmitting electricity to consumers, and cross-border networks for importing electricity from EU neighbors are extremely dangerous. This risks creating additional restrictions on the market.

“Such actions are aimed not only at depriving the country of light. The energy sector provides basic services for the existence of society. Therefore, its targeted destruction is also the destruction of morale, economy, industry, and social services to subjugate Ukraine,” Roman Andarak noted.

In addition to cross-border power lines and transformers, the aggressor’s target is the infrastructure of extractive enterprises that supply the Ukrainian economy with natural gas, oil, and coal. The Ministry of Energy notes that the hostilities have significantly affected industry in all regions of Ukraine, causing the destruction of facilities and the outflow of personnel. “Companies are doing everything they can, but they have limitations on their capabilities,” Roman Andarak noted.

Only nuclear power plants are operating stably. Their base capacity remains capable of providing about 50% of the country's electricity. "Because of this, consumers receive light at least part of the time during the day," the official summarized.

Challenge 2: Shortage of energy equipment

During the war, Ukraine became the main buyer in Europe of cogeneration plants, which provide for the simultaneous production of electricity and heat. In particular, more than 90 of them were purchased for the needs of communities from the Energy Security Project alone, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Now the problem is not only a shortage of funding, but also of equipment ready for sale, including for urgent repairs after attacks. Its production may take longer than customers from Ukraine need. Therefore, the shortage of equipment in the Ministry of Energy is called among the risks of the current winter.

“No power system in Europe would be able to survive alone in the conditions of such aggression,” said Serhiy Nazarenko, head of the Office for Identification and Countermeasures against Threats to Critical Infrastructure Objects of the national operator Ukrenergo.

Thanks to “unprecedented assistance” from international partners, he noted, the Ukrainian power system is currently the most protected in the world in terms of engineering structures, the operation of air defense systems, the available reserve of equipment and other means. Industry experts do not publicly disclose other details about protection – during a war, this is sensitive information, the disclosure of which could play into the enemy’s favor.

And to confirm the readiness to quickly restore power supply after damage, the Ukrenergo representative added: “If in Europe the period for replacing a transformer is 2 months, then here it is 16 days. We also have a well-developed algorithm of actions in critical situations.”

Challenge 3: Developing local and green generation

Deputy Minister of Energy Mykola Kolisnyk, during a discussion at the UESD, mentioned the importance of developing renewable energy sources (RES), in particular, wind generation. Such projects contribute to the sustainability and decarbonization of the Ukrainian energy system, and their support is a key priority for international partners.

He noted that the initiative to attract RES investments should come, first of all, from local authorities, so that decentralization in energy management becomes a reality.

"For communities, the presence of local generation is a competitive advantage - they gain energy independence. And at the same time, such projects become a source of tax revenues that can be directed to local development and solving social problems," the official explained.

According to him, the so-called "Energy Independence Passports" of regions, which are currently being created by the Ministry of Energy, should become a reference point for investors in the future.

However, the war, if not postpones, then slows down all ambitious plans.

In addition, the risks of investments in renewable energy are exacerbated by the debt crisis in the electricity market, which is mentioned in the Ministry of Energy. According to official data published by the state-owned enterprise “Guaranteed Buyer”, as of early November, the debt of the national energy company “Ukrenergo” to renewable energy producers exceeded UAH 32 billion

Challenge 4: Cyber threats and information terror

During his speech at the DiXi Group forum, Deputy Minister of Energy Roman Andarak explained the algorithm used by the Russians to make the Ukrainian energy system vulnerable. “On average, two days before the massive shelling, we record hundreds of thousands of powerful cyberattacks on all energy enterprises. This shows that the enemy acts systematically, combining physical and digital influence,” the official said.

At the same time, the presence of powerful professionals combined with unique experience during the war create the prerequisites for Ukraine to lead the cybersecurity direction in Eastern Europe. For example, in 2015, a few months after the annexation of Crimea, it was Ukrainian specialists who resisted attacks by pro-Russian hackers on the Ukrainian energy system, which led to a power outage in the western regions. This large-scale case of remote interference in the network operation is considered the first in the world that became known to the general public.

The DiXi Group forum also called Russian propaganda and information and psychological special operations regarding the state of the energy sector a challenge for energy security. The enemy’s goal is to spread panic among the population. According to the Ministry of Energy, the key destructive narratives concern distorted data on the generation deficit, the export of Ukrainian electricity, an “infrastructure disaster” and Russia’s ability to “quickly resolve all electricity issues” for Ukrainian consumers. To counter these threats, officials urge the use of only verified sources of information.

Challenge 5: Stopping gas transit

“What seemed impossible a few years ago is now becoming a reality. Everything indicates that from January 1, the transportation of Russian gas through the Ukrainian gas transportation system (GTS) will stop, this is our baseline scenario. But this will not have a decisive impact on the European energy market,” said Dmytro Lippa, head of the “GTS Operator of Ukraine” (OGTSU), in his speech at the Ukrainian Energy Security Dialogue 2024.

As for the sustainable supply of gas to consumers, he believes that due to the suspension of Russian gas transit, “the risks of attacks” on the gas transportation system in Ukraine are increasing. Due to wartime security restrictions on the disclosure of information, the speaker did not reveal details, but gave “a few figures” that, in his opinion, contribute to understanding the current situation. “The Ukrainian GTS has 511 compressor units on its balance sheet, 10 of which are currently operating. That is, we have significant potential that we can use,” noted Dmytro Lippa.

He also recalled that the total annual capacity of the GTS for gas transportation is “almost 150 billion cubic meters.” “We conducted stress tests together with the operator of underground gas storage facilities and production companies, so we can confidently say: stopping the GTS due to attacks is a rather apocalyptic scenario, and its probability is quite low. Technically, our GTS is able to withstand even with quite significant loads as a result of hostilities,” the head of the state-owned company noted.

Among other options that can ensure stable gas supply for Ukrainian consumers, he named sufficient volumes of domestically produced gas, access to alternative sources and routes for supplying blue fuel from Poland, Slovakia, and the Balkan countries.

But Dmytro Lippa paid special attention to the creation of the “first in history” guaranteed capacity for gas supplies to Ukraine from Moldova: from September 2024, the technical capabilities for importing gas in this direction are 1 million cubic meters. m per day, and in the second quarter of 2025 they will increase to 7 million cubic meters. m. "So today we can confidently say that, if necessary, the main part of Ukraine will be able to receive imported gas from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe via transit through Moldova. This is an additional route, but it is extremely important in war conditions," explained the head of the OGTSU.

Among the priorities of international cooperation, he also indicated interaction with the operator of the Polish gas transportation system Gaz-System. The companies agreed that from January 1, 2025, guaranteed capacities for the import of natural gas from Poland to Ukraine in the amount of about 5.15 million cubic meters will begin to operate. It will be offered to businesses for the first time at a monthly auction, which will be held on December 16, 2024.

“We strive to use all the possibilities of using the Ukrainian GTS,” said Dmytro Lippa. “Therefore, the Ukrainian GTS continues to work on increasing capacities in all areas.”

Svitlana Dolinchuk, specially for Ukrainian Energy

Tags:DiXi Group