To protect the Kremenchuk hydroelectric power station (HPP) from enemy strike drones, Ukrhydroenergo has ordered the construction of anti-drone structures for UAH 976 million. This was reported by the Prozorro resource.

The explanatory note states that the construction of the structures is being ordered to protect the hydroelectric power station from attacks by Russian strike drones. Such anti-drone structures will reduce the likelihood of damage to the hydroelectric power station by enemy “shaheeds”.

All work must be completed by December 25, 2025. The construction of the structures was estimated at UAH 976 million 950 thousand. The private company “UKRSTAL KONSTRUKTSIYA” will be engaged in the construction.

“Ukrainian Energy” learned how the state protects critical infrastructure facilities.

Sensitive information

It is worth noting right away that all information about the operation of hydroelectric power plants, both critical infrastructure facilities and information about the protection of such facilities from enemy attacks is sensitive and to some extent, for obvious reasons, hidden. However, in their research, the authors of the text are guided by open sources of information.

So, before the war, 55 large and small hydroelectric power plants operated in Ukraine. The main cascades of hydroelectric power plants are the Dnieper and Dniester cascades.

Among the largest hydroelectric power plants, Kremenchug is one of the largest on the Dnieper, with a capacity of 600 MW; DniproHES is the largest hydroelectric power plant in Ukraine, with a capacity of 1,877 MW; Kaniv HPP with a capacity of 444 MW; Sredneodneprovska HPP (capacity 222 MW) and Dniester HPP (has a capacity of 702 MW.)

In the 60s, about 1 thousand small HPPs with a total capacity of about 300 MW operated in Ukraine. In the 70s-80s, with the development of large thermal, nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, the centralization of energy supply, interest in small HPPs disappeared, their conservation and spontaneous, uncontrolled dismantling and decline began.

Before the war, all Ukrainian HPPs produced approximately 10 billion kWh of electricity per year. This was almost 20% of the total electricity production in the country.

According to Yuriy Kasich, ex-director of NPP Ukrenergo, member of the Public Sector Association "Hydropower of Ukraine", Ukraine has significant potential for the development of small hydropower, because more than 60 thousand small rivers flow through its territory. The greatest potential for the development of small hydropower plants is in the mountainous regions of Ukraine. According to information from various sources, studies show the possibility of building hundreds of small hydropower plants with a capacity of about 400 MW in the Carpathian region alone. At the same time, their construction will not affect the ecological state in any way and will not harm nature. In addition, there is a possibility of restoring about 100 old small hydropower plants without significant capital investments.

In war conditions, small hydropower plants are a valuable resource to counteract the consequences of terrorist attacks on the country's energy sector. Small hydropower plants are able to provide electricity to surrounding settlements along with all infrastructure (hospitals, communications, etc.) for almost an unlimited time, even in conditions of a complete "blackout" of the country.

Each individual small source of electrical energy does not carry strategic value, but all of them (small sources) together are valuable as a common source of energy in Ukraine. Small hydropower is part of the distributed generation of any energy system. It significantly increases the reliability and efficiency of the operation of both the power system as a whole and the distribution networks - this generation is as close as possible to the end consumer, it reduces the overall technological losses of electricity in the distribution networks. However, these are only prospects, although not bad.

And now Russia regularly attacks Ukrainian hydroelectric power plants as energy facilities.

Hydropower plants under attack

For example, on November 17, 2024, the Kremenchuk hydroelectric power plant was damaged during a massive combined shelling.

On August 26, 2024, Russia carried out a massive attack on Ukraine using drones and missiles, which led to damage to energy facilities in 15 regions, including damaged hydroelectric power plants, but information about this was provided rather briefly and without details.

In May, PrJSC "Ukrhydroenergo" announced the decommissioning of two hydroelectric power plants due to significant damage.

"Two hydroelectric power plants have been taken out of operation. On May 8, during the morning shelling of critical infrastructure, significant damage was also caused to hydropower facilities," the report says.

In March of this year, the enemy attacked the Dniprovska hydroelectric power plant.

"A direct hit on hydroelectric power plant-2. One missile flew through the crane beams and hit the support - that is, hydroelectric power plant-2 is in critical condition. hydroelectric power plant-1 is also not working now," said Ihor Syrota, director of Ukrhydroenergo, after the shelling.

One of the most painful blows was the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant in June 2023 - a large-scale ecological and man-made disaster, the consequences of which are difficult to comprehend. Thousands of hectares of land were underwater, infrastructure was destroyed, and total losses, according to the UN, exceeded $14 billion.

In total, during the entire period of the full-scale invasion, the enemy fired more than 150 missiles at the hydroelectric power plants and hydroelectric power plants (hydroaccumulated power plants) of Ukrhydroenergo, which deprived the country of 45% of its hydropower capacity.

These attacks had serious consequences for Ukraine's energy infrastructure, causing power outages and significant damage to facilities.

The enemy set itself the goal of disrupting energy supplies, creating a humanitarian crisis, destabilizing the situation in Ukraine, creating obstacles for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and still trying to force Ukraine to make concessions.

Needless to say, Russian attacks on Ukrainian hydroelectric power plants are a war crime and an act of ecocide, and the enemy's actions have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine and the entire world.

Defense for hundreds of millions

Russian attacks on Ukrainian hydroelectric power plants have become one of the most destructive components of the war. Ukraine is taking a set of measures to protect these critically important infrastructure facilities. However, is it enough?

It is important to understand that protecting hydroelectric power plants is a complex and multifaceted task that requires constant improvement and adaptation to new challenges.

Among the main areas of protection of hydroelectric power plants are the construction of fortifications and fortifications, additional shelters, protective structures and barriers around the hydroelectric power plant. Air defense systems are useful - the deployment of air defense systems to intercept cruise missiles and drones, providing additional protection against low-flying targets with anti-aircraft guns and using early warning systems for enemy attacks. Among other things, it is worth noting the implementation of engineering measures - mining approaches to complicate the landing of troops and the creation of engineering barriers to complicate the advancement of equipment.

Experts also note that to protect hydroelectric power plants, it is possible to strengthen the protection of control systems from hacker attacks and create backup control systems to minimize risks from cyberattacks. And of course, cooperation with international partners to obtain military assistance and technology, exchange of experience with other countries facing similar threats.

However, society and activists cannot control the protection of hydroelectric power plants due to the secrecy of information. However, something is becoming known to the public.

For example, in November, PJSC "Ukrhydroenergo" ordered PJSC "Ukrstal Konstruktsiya" to build anti-drone protection structures for the Kremenchug HPP branch for UAH 976.95 million without a tender. This was reported in the "Prozorro" system.

The procurement was carried out without open bidding due to the urgent need to implement the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters dated September 6, 2024, as stated in the justification for the procurement. The contract is currently unavailable for review.

Taking into account this contract, during 2022-2024, "Ukrhydroenergo" ordered the installation of anti-drone protection and the restoration of various HPP facilities after missile strikes for a total of UAH 13.77 billion. In most cases, contracts were concluded without bidding, and the final resource information was not made public.

In July 2020, PJSC Ukrhydroenergo concluded an agreement with PJSC Ukrhydroproject on design work for the Dnipro HPP for UAH 197.90 million. This was reported in the Prozorro system.

By the end of 2025, the design work “Construction of a structure to protect the building of HPP-2 of the Dnipro HPP branch of the Dnipro HPP” must be completed. Details are unknown, because the purchase was carried out without bidding with the justification “Ukrainian Liberation War” and the text of the contract was not published.

On August 16, 2023, PJSC Ukrhydroenergo concluded an agreement with PJSC Ukrhydroproject on design work for the Kakhovka HPP for UAH 124 million. This was reported in the Prozorro system.

This year, the design work “Construction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant on the Dnipro River. Preparatory work” must be completed. Details are unknown, because the purchase was carried out without bidding, with the justification of the “Ukrainian Liberation War” and the text of the contract was not published.

Whether design work is needed for the Kakhovka HPP, which is still located in the occupied territory, is a rhetorical question.

During the invasion, the government officially allowed procurement related to the protection of the power system and preparation for the heating season without regular tender procedures. It is allowed to contract with contractors selected without a tender and not to publish information about prices until the end of martial law. The goal is obvious - to allow buying quickly and hide sensitive information that the enemy can use. It is clear that the most sensitive is the data on the repair address, because the enemy also takes this information into account and adjusts the strikes.

It is clear that the state, if you follow the tenders, allocates hundreds of millions of hryvnias for the protection of the HPP, including. However, is this true?

This summer, the owner of Ukraine’s largest road repair company, Avtostrada, Maksym Shkil, publicly accused Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal on social media of blocking payments for the construction of protection for electrical substations from Russian strikes. He said that over the course of more than a year of work, the government had only funded 10%, which is why the work had been halted.

This means that our main substations (including those at the hydroelectric power station) still lack reliable missile protection, and therefore are a tempting target for the Russian Federation on the eve of the heating season, when energy will be in short supply anyway.

This means that our main substations (including those at hydroelectric power plants) still do not have reliable missile protection, and therefore are a tempting target for the Russian Federation on the eve of the heating season, when there will already be a shortage of energy, writes Yuriy Nikolov, editor-in-chief of the website "Nashi Groshi". In fact, unprotected substations are an invitation for Putin to arrange a total blackout for us with the collapse of the economy.

Active-passive protection

Expert on investments and financing of energy projects Viktor Kurtyev says that the protection of critically important facilities comes in two types - active and passive. Moreover, passive protection is always a losing option.

“In the fall of 2022, officials presented Volodymyr Zelensky with a losing strategy consisting of three types of protection – including sandbags, reinforced concrete fortifications over certain objects, and giant fortifications worth 15-20 billion hryvnias each. However, there are critical infrastructure facilities that cannot be protected with passive protection. I call this a scam that has cost a lot of money. Globally, it is necessary not to protect some substations according to a certain list, but to protect the country as a whole,” the expert says.

Kurtyev says that since 2022, Ukraine needed to actively enter the global market and purchase air defense and weapons to protect critical objects, instead of waiting for the transfer of air defense from partners.

“Back then, we had a completely different density of echeloned air defense across the country and a completely different level of protection of critical infrastructure,” Kurtyev says.

Former member of the National Commission for the Regulation of the Energy and Utilities Sector of Ukraine Olga Babiy explains that now even NATO member states have already understood that the only way to protect critical infrastructure is a systematic approach to the formation of defense means, air defense systems and other hybrid defense means.

“Now we have experience that prompts us to radically reconsider approaches to active defense. The first level is a general systemic air defense that “covers” infrastructure facilities of the entire country with zoning and identification of critical points (infrastructure facilities must be reviewed and a list of such facilities should be formed by the level of criticality). But what can we talk about when the protection of such important facilities is the work of the National Guard, while the National Guard does not have air defense units? That is, active interaction between different departments is needed. And the last level is what I would call the formation of brigades that will control the work of electronic warfare systems, mobile air defense groups, etc. We must build a defense system taking into account the experience of this war,” says Babiy.

Despite all the measures taken by the state, the threat to Ukrainian hydroelectric power plants remains high. Russian troops continue to demonstrate their readiness to use any means to achieve their goals. Therefore, restructuring and changing the approach to protecting critical facilities could be an option in these conditions.

Olena Marchenko, specially for "Ukrainian Energy"